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OFFICIAL NOTICE AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
1/
Daniel B. Rodriguez 
-
I. Introduction
While there is an emerging agreement, if not consensus,
that the administrative process has become vastly over-judicialized,
the explanations for this transformation from an essentially adminis-
trative structure to a judicial one are varied. Suggested cures
include a greater emphasis on rulemaking and substitution of informal
procedures for the truncated system of elaborate formal adjudication
required by the Administrative Procedure Act and various substantive
statutes.
Somewhat lost in the effort to explain the reasons behind
the present structure of administrative procedure and in the corre-
spondingly ambitious efforts to reconstruct the adjudicatory process
is the more immediately pressing, and yet similarly intractable
problem, how to live with the system we do have. In other words, is
there any room for improvement in the present adjudicative system
that does not, at the same time, call for a wholesale reconstruction,
either by replacing complex adjudication with rulemaking or by
"deregulating" the adjudicative process? Perhaps a certain sort of
1/ Professor Rodriguez graduated Phi Beta Kappa from California
State University, Long Beach, in 1984. He received his Juris Doctor
degree in 1987 from Harvard University, where he was editor of the
Harvard Law Review. He was judicial law clerk for Hon. Alex Kozinski
of the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. He is currently
an acting professor at Boalt Hall School of Law, University of
California, Berkeley. His publications include The Substance of the
New Legal Process, California Law Review, Vol. 77 (July, 1989) and
Free Speech: In Search of Pattern, American Bar Association Journal,
Vol. 74 (December, 1988). Professor Rodriguez also presented the
paper Presidential Signing Statements to the annual meeting of the
Western Political Science Association in March of this year. The
present paper was delivered at the Annual Meeting and Seminar of the
National Association of Administrative Law Judges' Annual Convention,
New Orleans, Louisiana, October, 1989.
tinkering is required while systematic solutions swirl around, eph
competing for acceptance as the "New Administrative Procedure." -
Current attempts to refashion administrative evidence and,
more broadly, the ways in which ALJ's should and must receive and
evaluate facts, are the most notable form of this tinkering. Thedefining characteristic of modern administrative evidence law is thatthere is virtually none. Even the formal adjudication provisions of
the Administrative Procedure Act provide for near to nothing by way
of formal evidentiary requirements. Save for an amorphous proscrip-
tion against the taking of "immatrial, irrelevant, or unduly repeti-
tious evidence" in Sec. 556(d), - there are no other specific
evidentiary reqU rements adumbrated in the APA for use in formal
adjudications. 
-
That is, except for one: the official notice provision of556(e). This paper concerns the use and utility of official noticein administrative proceedings, focusing in particular on the American
Bar Association's suggestions for refashioning official notice law inits proposed uniform rules of evidence for agency adjudications. My
narrow thesis is that the ABA's proposals are seriously flawed,
transforming official notice from a useful administrative and judicial
tool to a weak and complex procedural device. The broad thesis,
sketched out in general terms in the conclusion, is that this attempted
reconstruction of the official notice and the flaws in the ABA's
efforts reflects a more serious shortcoming in recent efforts to
rationalize administrative evidence and to regulate the adjudicative
process in the federal agencies.
Z/ See generally, W. Gellhorn, et al., Administrative Law: Cases
and Comments Ch. 7-8 (8th ed. 1987); Verkuil, The Emerging Concept
of Administrative Procedure, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 258 (1978).
3/ 5 U.S.C. #556(d) (1946).
4/ This assertion is true of the formal adjudication structure of
the Administrative Procedure Act. Of course, other agencies may, aL
some do, have their own separate sets of rules governing adjudica-
tions.
II. Official Notice and Administrative Adjudication
A. Definition
The APA, which governs formal adjudications, that is,
hearings required by statute "to be determignd on the record after
opportunity for an agency hearing. .....", - lays out the standards
for taking official notice in Section 556. The final sentence of
556(e) provides that "[w]hen an agency decision rests on official
notice of a material fact not appearing in the evidence in the
record, a party is entitled, on timely request, to an opportunity to
show the contrary." Official notice, related (though not iVntical)
to the concept of judicial notice in ordinary proceedings, - refers
to the acceptance by the ALJ of a particular fact as "true" without
considering independent evidence introduced by either party or,
indeed, without providing either party with an a priori opportunity
to introduce such evidence.
The a priori caveat is crucial. All official notice
approaches accept that both parties must be provided with some
opportunity, even if after the fact is noticed, to introduce contrary
evidence. Accepting that the sun rose at 6:00 a.m. on the morning of
January 1, 1989, is a relatively uncontroversial use of official
notice. Nonetheless, an ambitious advocate might try--and must be
provided with some opportunity--to disprove this fact. Accordingly,
556(e) provides a 9 rty with "an opportunity to show the contrary" of
the fact noticed. -
5/ 5 U.S.C. #554(a) (1946). Courts have tended to construe this
provision broadly, holding that a requirement that agencies conduct
an adjudicatory hearing indicates that such a hearing should be on
the record and in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act.
See, e.g., Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 876,
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978). Accord Steadman v. SEC, 450
U.S. 91, 96-97 n.13 (1981).
6/ Judicial notice in non-administrative proceedings is governed by
Fed. R. Evid. 201. See p. 5 infra. See generally, c. McCormick on
Evidence #359, at 1028 n.l (E. Cleary, et al. 3d ed. 1984) ("[tihe
term 'official notice' is probably unfortunate in suggesting too much
of a parallel to judicial notice. Much that is done and advocated to
be done in the name of official notice might with less violence to
the language be catalogued under presumptions").
7/ The precise scope of this post-notice hearing is unclear.
(Footnote Continued)
B. Complications
1. Adjudicative versus lecislative facts
8/ In an influential article written over a half century
ago, - Professor Kenneth Culp Davis posited a distinction between
what he called adjudicative and leoislative facts. Adjudicative
facts are facts that concern only the parties before the court. For
instance, in a negligence action brought by A against B for running a
stop sign and running into him, whether there was in fact a stop sign
at the particular street corner is an adjudicative fact. Non-
adjudicative, or what Professor Davis also called "legislative"
facts-, are facts that have importance beyond the mere scope of the
lawsuit. They are the sort of facts "utilized for informing a9 /
court's legislative judgment on questions of law and policy." - In
a suit for deceptive advertising brought by a French perfume manufac-
turer charging an American manufacturer with representing the American':
perfume as French, the fact that consumers would, all things beiL/
equal, prefer French perfume to American is a legislative fact. -
The resolution of this fact will have a direct impact on the outcome
of the lawsuit between these two parties, to be sure, but the under-
lying fact is not unique to these two parties. Moreover, the resolu-
tion of the fact would have a direct bearing on any similar lawsuit
brought by any two other parties subsequently. The judge, by taking
official notice of this fact, has decided something that transcends
the dispute between these two parties.
(Footnote Continued)
Presumably, a reasonable opportunity to show the contrary would
include some introduction of evidence including, perhaps, oral
testimony. No court has suggested, however, that this opportunity
must include oral testimony, cross-examination, or any other specific
form of evidence. Cf. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975)
(holding, in a case involving public school suspension, that due
process is satisfied by "an informal give-and-take" between student
and disciplinary authority).
8/ Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative
Process, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 364 (1942).
9/ Id. at 492. See also 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law
Treatise 135 (2d ed. 1980).
L/ See, e.g., Harsam Distributors, Inc., 54 F.T.C. 1212 (1958),
aff'd, 263 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1959); Fioret Sales Co., 26 F.T.C. 806,
aff'd, 100 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1938).
2. Disputable versus indisputable facts
The central rationale behind the longstanding tradition of
judicial notice in court proceedings was the recognition that certain
matters were susceptible to resolution by mere common sense, the
experience of day-to-day living possessed by the ordinary judge.
Certain facts were true beyond dispute and hence providing for the
receipt and consideration of evidence by either or both parties in a
dispute would be superfluous.
The problem with limiting official notice to such facts is
that there remain facts that, while not so indisputable as to be
considered within every ordinary person's common sense, are nonethe-
less susceptible to resolution by an expert adjudicator. While the
proverbial "reasonable person" might not be able to take judicial
notice of a given fact as true, an expert judge would. This scenario
was submerged under the weight of the general assumption that judges
are merely specially-trained lay persons. While educated in the law,
judges would not be presumed to know anything more than the well-
educated citizen and, hence, could not claim a special expertise that
would enable him to notice facts that would otherwise be disputed by
others.
The Model Code of Evidence declared the essential require-
ment of proper official notice when it pointed out that "[i]f a
matter falls within theldomain of judicial knowledge, it is beyond
the realm of dispute." --1 Comment on R. 804(2) (3) (1942). And,
significantly, the notion of "judicial knowledge" was carefully
limited to that sort of knowledge that a judge would have by virtue
of his training in th1 2 aw--what Professor Thayer called his "neces-
sary mental outfit." - The result was a system of judicial notice
that allowed for notice in basically two sets of circumstances:
first, in instances of indisputable adjudicative facts and, second,
where a judge purported to notice l sting laws, such as the exis-
tence of an international treaty. -
The structure of APA Section 556(e) reflects the separation
of official notice from its judicial notice roots. While
11/ Advisory Committee's Comment on Fed. R. Evid. 804(2), (3)
(1942).
12/ J. Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence 280 (1898).
13/ See generally Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 269
(1944).
indisputability was an indispensable requirement of judicial notice
at common law, official notice began with a recognition of the
special capacities of administrative law judges (then hearing examin-
ers) to consider and evaluate facts that would be otherwise disputable
among lay parties.
C. Judicial Notice and the Federal Rules of Evidence
Currently, judicial notice in the federal district courts
is governed by Fed. R. Evid. 201. This rule provides for the taking
of judicial notice of adjudicative facts that are "not subject to
reasonable dispute." The rule defines an indisputable fact as one
"(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned."
F.R.E. 201(a)(b). While a court may take judicial notice at any
time, it is required to do so if requested by a party and supplied
with the necessary information. F.R.E. 201(e). Significantly, a
party is entitled to a hearing on the "propriety of taking judicial
notice and the tenor of the matter noticed." F.R.E. 201(e). There
is no federal rule addressing judicial notice of non-adjudicative
facts.
D. Official Notice and the Administrative Procedure Act
The basic contents of the APA official notice provision are
described above. There are a number of important differences between
Sec. 556(e) and the analogous Federal Rule. First, the APA does not,
by its express terms or otherwise, limit the taking of official
notice to adjudicative facts. Second, official notice is discretion-
ary; that is, there is no requirement that the ALJ take official
notice of either an adjudicative or a legislative fact if requested
by a party. Third, there is no provision for what I call a "propriety"
hearing, meaning a requested hearing on the propriety of taking
judicial notice. Instead, a party is entitled to challenge the ALJ's
decision to take official notice by presenting rebuttal evidence.
Fourth, and most significantly of all, the APA does not require, as a
precondition for the taking of official notice, that the fact noticed
be indisputable. This is not to suggest that the ALJ's authority to
dispense with an evidentiary hearing is unlimited as a result of
556(e). Nonetheless, the ALJ is entitled to avail himself of special
expertise within his own knowledge or informationl
_  
a way that would
be unacceptable if carried out by a trial judge.
III. The ABA's Proposed Official Notice Rule
The American Bar Association's Section on Administrative
Law and Regulatory Practice has now completed its task of creating a
set of uniform rules of practice and procedure for administrative
hearings before the Office of Administrative Law Judges. The Depart-
ment of Labor has, through notice-and-comment rulemaking, adopted the
uniform rules for hearings before ALJ's hearing Department of Labor
cases. Moreover, it is the ABA's aim to convince all agencies who
have the statutory authority to adopt such rules to do so.
A. The Structure of the Official Notice Rule
The proposed rule is as follows:
#18.201 Official notice of adjudicative facts.
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only official
notice of adjudicative facts.
(b) Kinds of facts. An officially noticed fact must
be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is
either (1) generally known within the local area, (2) capable
of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned, or (3) de-
rived from a not reasonably disputed scientific, medical or
other technical process, technique, principle, or explana-
tory theory within the administrative agency's specialized
field of knowledge.
(c) When discretionary. A judge may take official
notice, whether requested or not.
(d) When mandatory. A judge shall take official
notice if requested by a party and supplied with the
necessary information.
14/ See Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure
Act (1947).
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled upon
timely request to an opportunity to be heard as to the
propriety of taking official notice and the tenor of the
matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the
request may be made after official notice has been taken.
(f) Time of takina notice. Official notice may be
taken at any stage of the proceeding.
(g) Effect of official notice. An officially noticed
fact is accepted as conclusive.
In its proposed rule, the Committee adopts the basic
structure of the federal judicial notice rule with the significant
addition of Section (b) (3), which section authorizes the ALJ to take
official notice of an indisputable fact "derived from a not
reasonably disputed scientific, medical, or other technical process,"
etc.
B. A Critique
What is unclear at the outset is whether this official
notice provision disturbs, in any important respect, the existing
official notice provision of the Administrative Procedure Act
(Sec. 556(3)). With the adoption of this provision, there are a
number of scenarios possible:
(1) 18.201 supersedes the final sentence of 556(e) and, there-
fore, an ALJ may take official notice only in accordance
with the provisions of 201.
(2) As 18.201 covers adjudicative facts only, there is no
evidence rule that deals with non-adjudicative facts. But,
unlike scenario #1, official notice could still be taken of
legislative facts since no rule prohibits such notice.
Unlike the current version of 556(e), however, the party
against whom official notice is being taken has no right to
introduce rebuttal evidence.
(3) While 18.201 applies only to adjudicative facts, AL's
would remain free to take official notice of non-
adjudicative facts as long as such facts are "not subject
to reasonable dispute."
(4) 18.201 leaves 556(e) undisturbed. The former will apply in
situations where the ALJ would notice "adjudicative facts"
and the latter applies in other cases. Presumably, the
judge would make a threshold determination regarding what
category the fact at issue falls into before she may
determine which rule applies.
1. Scenario one: 18.201 as the exclusive official notice
rule
The first scenario, where 201 supersedes 556(e), would
replace a largely effective approach to official notice in adminis-
trative proceedings--represented by the current APA Sec. 556(e)--with
an inadequate substitute. It is inadequate because it carves out one
particular type of fact, the so-called "adjudicative" fact, for
official notice treatment, leaving all other facts to the normal
processes of proof. This "one step forward, two steps back" approach
would be a most unwelcome development for several reasons.
The current APA approach which permits ALJ's to take
official notice of non-adjudicative facts in formal adjudications
makes good sense. Official notice is a powerful tool for ALJ's to
craft efficient and fair hearings while, at the same time, bringing
to bear their expertise on concrete statutory and regulatory issues
with the aim of improving the regulatory process. A rule which
would, in one fell swoop, disable ALJ's from taking notice of facts
that have relevance and applicability beyond the dispute between the
two parties before the agency, would defeat many of the purposes
behind the administrative process generally. /Professor Davis
stressed in his debate with Professor Morgan, - and has been
emphasized in the decades since then, the administrative process is 6
different in important respects than the standard judicial process.
15/ See, e.a., 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise Ch. 15 (2d
ed. 1980); Davis, A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and
Convenience, in Perspectives of Law 69 (1964); Morgan, Judicial Notice,
57 Harv. L. Rev. 269 (1944).
16/ See, e.a., FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134,
143 (1940) (difference in origins and functions of administrative
agencies "preclude wholesale transplantation of the rules of proce-
dure, trial, and review which have evolved from the history and
experience of courts."). See also Verkuil, supra; Pedersen, The
Decline of Separation of Functions in Regulatory Agencies, 64 Va. L.
Rev. 991, 1005 (1978) ("[c]lothing nonaccusatory administrative
hearings with more of the trappings of adjudicative proceedings may
make better theater, but it probably reduces their substantive
importance."); Boyer, Alternatives to Administrative Trial-Type
(Footnote Continued)
While the rationalization of administrative adjudication achieved by
these Uniform Rules is a welcome development, the attempt to collapse
the two regimes into one with respect to all the rules would be quite
unwelcome. As for official notice, preserving the prerogative of the
ALJ to take official notice of legislative facts reflects an important
accommodation of the demands of evidentiary rationalization on the
one hand and the realities of the quasj5egislative functions of
administrative agencies on the other. - The official notice
provision of 556(e) has worked pretty well since its adoption, and it
would be a mistake to abandon it for the sake of maintaining some
consistency between the Uniform Rules and the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
The alternative to official notice of legislative facts is
the consideration of such facts through the normal processes of
proof. Of course, after the adoption of the Uniform Rules, these
so-called normal processes take on an even more complicated cast. We
would move from a situation in which there is some kind of a hearing
where the ALJ purports to take official notice of a legislative fact,
to a situation where, because the ALJ cannot take official notice at
all, that legislative fact is subject to the general standards of
proof. The costs of such proof are not unsubstantial. As the
revisors of Professor McCormick's evidence treatise note: "The
primary thrust behind official notice is to simplify or ease the
process of proof. Where facts are known or can be safely assumed,
the process of proving what is already known is both time consuming
and unduly formal. When facts have been proven before, furj r proof
becomes tiresome, redundant, and lacking in common sense." - They
discuss the example of the FTC's practice of taking official notice
of the fut that American consumers prefer American to foreign-made
goods. - While this is only a presumption, since under 556(e) a
(Footnote Continued)
Hearings for Resolving Complex Scientific, Economic, and Social Issues,
71 Mich. L. Rev. 111, 137 (1972) ("forcing the task of administrative
regulation into the ill-fitting mold of judicial procedure may be
simply a stop-gap measure, symptomatic of a need to develop new and
better decision-making methods.").
17/ See, e.., FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Committee for Broadcasting,
436 U.S. 775 (1978).
18/ C. McCormick, supra, at 1029.
19/ Id. at 1030. See Brite Manufacturing Co., 65 F.T.C. 1067
(Footnote Continued)
party may introduce evidence which rebuts that fact in a particular
case (e.g., where evidence indicates that consumers prefer French to
American perfumes), the effect of it is to vastly streamline what
would otherwise be a quite costly process. Moreover, to the extent
that the burden of proving certain facts is usually on one party
throughout the range of cases a particular agency considers (e.g., on
the agency in FTC disputes), the costs of disabling the ALJ from
taking official notice will be squarely imposed on those parties in
each case.
Allowing official notice of legislative facts helps agencies
to create and maintain a body of accumulated knowledge and experience.
Where the FTC may take official notice of, say, the American preference
for American goods, the agency is able to deploy its special expertise
in the interests of efficiency as well as more accurate decisionmaking.
This is consistent with the nature of the administrative, as opposed
to the judicial, process. Indeed, it is quite understandable that
the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence excluded legislative
facts from the ken of judges since the traditional (albeit oversim-
plified) understanding of the judicial process is inconsistent with a
view of the judge as lawmaker. But it would be anomalous to impose
these very same understandings on the modern administrative agency.
"[A]dministrative agencies," say the McCormick treatise authors,
"were often created to become repositories of knowledge and experience.
It would defeat their existence to require adherence to traditional
methods of proof whe 0 9lternative and equally fair methods are
readily available." --
2. Scenario two: dispensinQ with rebuttal hearing
A second scenario is one in which official notice of
legislative facts is permissible but, significantly, there would no
longer be a 556(e) requirement of notice and opportunity to be heard.
Of course, 18.201 covers, by its own terms, only adjudicative facts.
However, if the clear purpose of the Uniform Rules is to displace any
existing rules of administrative evidence in the APA, of which the
last sentence of 556(e) is one, then there is no longer any rule that
expressly covers non-adjudicative facts. Perhaps, then, ALJ's would
be free to take official notice of such facts without any notice and
hearing requirements. This scenario would raise potential constitu-
tional problems. There are procedural due process concerns present
(Footnote Continued)
(1964), aff'd, 347 F.2d 477 (1965); Savoy Watch Co., 63 aff'd,
F.T.C. 473 (1963); Baldwin Bracelet Corp., 61 F.T.C. 1345 (1962),
aff'd, 325 F.2d 1012 (1963).
20/ C. McCormick, supra, at 1029.
where an ALJ purports to take as conclusive a disputable legislative
fact without any opportunity to respond.
These concerns animated the Supreme Court's decisionin
Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n of Ohio. /
Ohio Bell involved a rate-making valuation proceeding in which the
PUC took official notice of price trends during the period 1926 to
1933. They did so on the basis of price indices from a leading
engineering magazine as well as from the findings of a Federal court
in a similar case. Appellant was given no opportunity to respond to
the PUC's information; nor was it instructed that the court had based
its decision principally on the facts it had officially noticed
rather than the voluminous record of the proceeding. Writing for the
court, Justice Cardozo objected that this proceeding, because of the
PUC's conduct, bore none of the required characteristics of a fair
hearing. "To press the doctrine of judicial notice to the extent
attempted in this case . . . would be t/turn the doctrine into a
pretext for dispensing with a trial." -
One could read Ohio Bell consistently with the scenario in
which 18.201 disallows any official notice of non-adjudicative facts.
The subsequent history of the case and the APA enacted ten years
later, however, refutes such a construction. The APA drafters
certainly had Ohio Bell in mind when they crafted the official notice
provision. Moreover, the legislative history of 556(e) along with
the intervening caselaw suggests that the APA drafters read Ohio Bell
to allow official notice of the type of facts considered in that case
as long as some sort of notice and "opportunity to show the contrary"
was provided. This understanding is reflected in the influential
Attorney General's Manual on the APA which made clear that, as long
as these notice and hearing requirements were met, there was no
particular limitation of the adjudicative-lip'slative fact sort on
what the agency could legitimately notice. -
Ohio Bell and its progeny may reflect a procedural due
process requirement that some notice and hearing be provided where
disputable legislative facts are officially noticed. If so, inter-
preting 18.201 to preempt 556(e) and, in turn, to leave ALJ's
21/ 301 U.S. 292 (1937).
22/ Id. at 300.
23/ Attorney General's Manual at 79.
unconstrained in taking official notice of gislative facts would
raise significant constitutional concerns. -
Why, if the Constitution requires notice and hearing where
an ALJ takes notice of legislative facts, are there no such due
process problems created by FRE 201 (and the new 18.201)? The answer
is two-fold: First, there are some safeguards in 201, namely, notice
and the opportunity for a hearing on at least the propriety of taking
notice. While a "propriety" hearing is not the same as a substantive
opportunity to adduce facts refuting the ALJ's officially-noticed
fact, at least notice and some hearing is provided. If an ALJ is
unconstrained in taking official notice of non-adjudicative facts, as
I am assuming here, not even a propriety hearing would be required.
Second, 18.201 is expressly limited to facts that are "not subject to
reasonable dispute ...... ".What are at issue here are facts about
which the usual elements of a hearing would be irrelevant. Of
course, the traditional procedural due process doctrine does
require hearings when such hearings would be largely futile.
would think, therefore, that there would be no due process problems
with taking notice of indisputable adjudicative facts.
3. Scenario three: official notice of only indisputable
adjudicative facts
This latter point raises a third alternative: Perhaps
official notice can be taken of non-adjudicative facts only where
such facts are indisputable. The absurdity of imposing an "indisput-
ability" requirement on the taking of official notice of legislative
facts was described well by Professor Davis who explains that imposing
such a req iement "would virtually emasculate the administrative
process." - Because of their very character, so-called legislative
facts are almost by definition subject to reasonable dispute. The
real question is whether they are subject to the type of dispute that
can be resolved, or at least illuminated, best through the traditional
processes of proof or, alternatively, through a carefully-crafted
official notice provision. The effect of an indisputability
24/ For judicial suggestions that some sort of notice and comment
is required, see United States v. Abilene & Southern R. Co., 265
U.S. 274 (1924); ICC v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 227 U.S. 88
(1913). Neither case rested its rejection of official notice on
procedural due process grounds, however.
25/ See, e.g., Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
26/ Davis, Official Notice, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 537, 539 (1949).
requirement on official notice of non-adjudicative facts is rather
simple: Such facts will rarely if ever be subject to official
notice.
4. Official notice of adjudicative facts
Considering the ABA's proposed rule on its own terms, as an
official notice provision dealing solely with adjudicative facts, I
believe that the structure of the rule is analytically inconsistent.
The rule is limited to indisputable facts (which, of course, is the
thrust of Professor Morgan's position codified in FRE 201). Further-
more, Section (b) (3) of the proposed rule provides that an ALJ may
take official notice of facts "derived from a not reasonably disputed
scientific, medical or other technical process, technique, principle,
or explanatory theory within the administrative agency's specialized
field of knowledge." These two references to indisputable facts are
importantly different. The latter refers to an indisputable process,
principle, or theory while the former requires that the basic fact
subject to proof must be indisputable. A clarifying example: X, a
plaintiff in a paternity suit, wants to prove that her child has been
fathered by Y. She seeks to do so through the usual chemical tests.
The scientific process used to determine the genetic connection
between the child and Y is indisputable but of course the underlying
fact--the identity of the father--is quite controversial. Accordingly,
the judge cannot take official notice of the fact but must, instead,
leave this up to the normal proof process. This makes obvious sense
in the traditional judicial proceeding. While the scientist who
administers the test is an expert, the judge who would officially
notice the fact is not. In the administrative process, however,
things may be quite different. An ALJ is a judge, to be sure, but
she may also be an administrative expert. She may, and probably
does, have a "specialized field of knowledge" that would enable her
to resolve squarely a factual dispute in a way an ordinary judge
could not. Indeed, the ALJ's unique twin abilities to bring her
expertise both as an administrator and as a judge to bear on an
administrative dispute highlights one of the important distinctions
between an administrative law judge and a trial judge and, more
generally, between the administrative and ordinary trial processes.
Of course, the proposal recognizes this distinction when it
includes this "specialized field of knowledge" proviso. But, by
leaving in place the peculiarly judicial requirement that the facts
subject to official notice be indisputable, it offers an unsatisfac-
tory solution. It imposes the strictures of the judicial process,
complete with its assumption of a judge who is a "jack-of-all-trades-
master-of-none" onto the administrative process. And, with (b) (3),
it acknowledges the special abilities of the administrative agency as
expert without at the same time letting the agency be expert.
Consider the anomaly: A reviewing court will be given the
authority to decide whether a fact that an expert agency has taken
official notice of is "subject to reasonable dispute" based upon
criteria which it, the reviewing court, is far less familiar with
than the expert agency who sought to take official notice of the fact
in the first place. Another example, this e from Professor
Schwartz's excerpt in the Reporter's Note: - Claimant maintains
that an inguinal hernia was traumatic in origin. ALJ, expert in
diagnosing hernias, sees that employee gave no indication of pain and
continued work for a month after the alleged accident. Under 556(e),
the fact would be noticeable as long as agency allows employee
opportunity to rebut. Under proposal as Reporter's Note would have
it, the fact would be noticeable and employee would have no oppor-
tunity to rebut. Under the current proposal as I read it, however,
the fact would not be noticeable. All the employee would need to
show is that fact is disputable, which he apparently could do by
introducing doctor's report. Just because agency is "as expert in
diagnosing [hernias] as any doctor would be" does not indicate that
agency's diagnosis is indisputable. On the contrary, the fact that
doctor is at least as expert as the agency suggests precisely the
opposite. The problem is that in those situations, like Schwartz's
example, where we would want the ALJ to bring his expertise to bear
on a factual question in the form of official notice, the proposed
rule would in all likelihood prohibit him from doing so as long as
one party is prepared to show that the fact is disputable.
IV. Conclusion
Everyone associated with the administrative process wants a
rational evidentiary system. The principal questions concern the
costs of a more or less formal system and the workability of system-
atic reconstruction of the way in which ALJ's currently receive and
process evidence and determine facts.
The ABA is to be congratulated for its attempts to ration-
alize the evidentiary process in administrative adjudications. As
with any such holistic effort, however, some parts are better than
others. I have suggested that the proposed official notice rule is
fundamentally misguided. By expressly excluding legislative facts
from its coverage, it disables ALJ's from employing official notice
as a potent tool to improve administrative policy through the medium
of case-by-case adjudication. And, with respect to adjudicative
27/ See Reporter's Note to #18.201, Fed. Reg. 2324 (citing
B. Schwartz, Administrative Law #7.16, at 375 (2d ed. 1984).
facts, the rule imposes an unworkable indisputability requirement on
experienced and specially trained ALJ's.
More generally, the ABA projects the traditional judicial
procedure model, a model particularly suited to jury trials, onto the
administrative process. Of course, the administrative process is
different in important ways. While we work to construct alternative
adjudicative models of administrative procedure, we should think long
and hard before adopting ill-fitting models in the face of an
admitted need to improve upon existing administrative procedure.
Even where the values of evidentiary rationalization are high, there
are costs attached to such regulatory efforts. Insofar as these
costs are borne by the individual ALJ's struggling to carry out their
duties in the ever-growing administrative bureaucracy, we should take
a close look at these costs as they arise in context of particular
proposals. While this paper addresses one particular proposal, much
work is left to be done.
